Country-level cost-effectiveness thresholds : initial estimates and the need for further research by Woods, Bethan Sarah et al.
 1 
 
Country-level cost-effectiveness thresholds: initial estimates and the need for further research 
Beth Woods (MSc)1^, Paul Revill (MSc)1^, Mark Sculpher (PhD)1, Karl Claxton(PhD)1 
1 Centre for Health Economics, University of York, United Kingdom.  
^ Equal contributions. 
Corresponding authors: Beth Woods 
Centre for Health Economics  
Alcuin 'A' Block 
University of York 
Heslington, York 
YO10 5DD UK 
Tel: +44 (0)1904 321401 
Fax: +44 (0)1904 321402 
beth.woods@york.ac.uk 
Financial support: This research report was produced as part of the Lablite project 
(http://www.lablite.org/), as well as the International Decision Support Initiative 
(www.idsihealth.org), a global initiative to support decision makers in priority-setting for 
universal health coverage. This work received funding support from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Department for International Development (UK), and the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Mark Sculpher receives support from the UK  National Institute for Health 
Research as a Senior Investigator (NF-SI-0513-10060).  The views expressed are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the funders. 
Key words: Threshold; Cost-effectiveness; Willingness to pay; Quality Adjusted Life Years; 
Benefits package; Universal Health Care. 
 2 
 
Running title: Country-level cost effectiveness thresholds  
Acknowledgements: We thank attendees at the Health Economics Study Group in Leeds, 
January 2015 for useful feedback on an earlier draft of this manuscript.  
 
  
 3 
 
Abstract (max 250) 
Objectives: Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) can guide policymakers in resource allocation 
decisions. CEA assesses whether the health gains offered by an intervention are large enough 
relative to any additional costs to warrant adoption. Where there are constraints on the healthcare 
system’s budget or ability to increase expenditures, additional costs imposed by interventions 
have an ‘opportunity cost’ in terms of the health foregone as other interventions cannot be 
provided. Cost-effectiveness thresholds (CETs) are typically used to assess whether an 
intervention is worthwhile and should reflect health opportunity cost.  However, CETs used by 
some decision makers - such as the World Health Organization (WHO) suggested CETs of 1-3 
times gross domestic product per capita (GDP pc) - do not.  This study estimates CETs based on 
opportunity cost for a wide range of countries. 
Methods: We estimate CETs based upon recent empirical estimates of opportunity cost (from 
the English NHS), estimates of the relationship between country GDP pc and the value of a 
statistical life, and a series of explicit assumptions.    
Results: CETs for Malawi (the lowest income country in the world), Cambodia (borderline 
low/low-middle income), El Salvador (borderline low-middle/upper-middle) and Kazakhstan 
(borderline high-middle/high) are estimated to be $3-116 (1-51% GDP pc), $44-518 (4-51%), 
$422-1,967 (11-51%) and $4,485-8,018 (32-59%); respectively. 
Conclusions:  To date opportunity cost-based CETs for low/middle income countries have not 
been available. Although uncertainty exists in the underlying assumptions, these estimates can 
provide a useful input to inform resource allocation decisions and suggest that routinely used 
CETs have been too high.  
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Introduction  
Policy-makers in all healthcare systems face difficult choices about which interventions, 
programmes or activities (hereinafter referred to solely as ‘interventions’) should be funded from 
limited available resources. The tools of economic evaluation offer a variety of means to assist 
policymakers in the process of prioritisation. A common approach is incremental cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) which is based upon the comparative assessment of costs and 
benefits, with the latter generally focussed on health gains. CEA seeks to identify which 
interventions offer health gains large enough, relative to their costs, to warrant adoption.[1]  
CEA typically includes detailed information about the incremental costs (∆ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠) and 
incremental health effects (∆ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ ) of an intervention relative to alternative interventions. The 
results of CEA are often expressed as an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER); the ratio of 
incremental costs to incremental health effects (∆ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 ∆ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ ⁄ ).[1]  Health effects are often 
represented as quality adjusted life years (QALYs) or disability adjusted life years (DALYs) 
averted; and so the ICER gives the ‘cost per QALY-gained/DALY-averted’ associated with an 
intervention.  Although these are useful summaries, the question remains as to whether a 
particular cost per QALY-gained/DALY-averted ought to lead to the evaluated intervention 
being considered cost-effective.  
If an intervention offers incremental health gains but at some additional costs then a decision 
regarding whether it should be funded should be informed by the value of what will be given up 
as a consequence of those costs (i.e. the opportunity cost of funding the intervention[2]).  All 
systems face some restrictions on the resources available for healthcare. If resources are 
committed to the funding of one intervention then they are not available to fund and deliver 
others. The opportunity cost of a commitment of resources is, therefore, the health forgone as 
these “other” interventions that are available to the health system cannot be delivered.  Even if 
additional resources are placed into the healthcare system to be made available for a particular 
new intervention, there is an opportunity cost to these resources - the health that could have 
been gained by investing these additional resources elsewhere in the system.  
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In the context of CEA, the opportunity cost can be expressed using a cost-effectiveness 
threshold (CET).  CETs based on opportunity costs describe the amount of money that, if 
removed from the healthcare system, would result in one less unit of health being generated, or 
equivalently, the cost of generating health in the current system.  In the case of the introduction 
of a new intervention that imposes additional costs on the system, this is equivalent to a marginal 
reduction in the resources available for other activities.  If the ICER (cost per QALY/DALY 
gained) is less than the CET it means that diverting funds to the intervention will increase 
population health. For example if the CET is $1000/QALY and the ICER for an intervention is 
$100/QALY, then for every $1000 spent on the intervention 1 QALY is lost in the wider 
healthcare system but 10 are gained from the new intervention. The net health effect is positive. 
Therefore, if an ICER<CET, an intervention can be considered ‘cost-effective’; but if 
ICER>CET the benefits are insufficient in comparison to costs and the intervention  can be 
considered not to be cost-effective.  Hence CEA simplifies to an assessment of whether a new 
intervention will result in gains in population health and the inverse of the CET should reflect 
the marginal product of healthcare spending (∆ ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ ∆ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 ⁄ ).   
Estimating the opportunity cost of healthcare spending (estimating the CET) is, therefore, a 
crucial aspect of any resource allocation decision in healthcare.  
 
Understanding cost-effectiveness thresholds 
Recent methods research has emphasised the centrality of opportunity costs in informing 
resource allocation decisions and how CETs can be appropriately estimated for CEA to inform 
decisions aimed at improving population health[3, 4] – see Drummond et al. (2015) chapter 4 for 
a full overview.[1]  A clear distinction needs to be made between two related, but separate, 
concepts which have informed the debate regarding the most appropriate value for the CET: (i) 
opportunity costs in terms of health foregone when costs fall on healthcare budgets; and (ii) 
opportunity costs in terms of foregone consumption (the ‘consumption value of health’) when 
additional costs fall on consumption opportunities outside healthcare. The first is an issue of 
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‘fact’, resulting from limits in the overall collective budget available for healthcare or constraints 
on health system’s abilities to increase expenditure. It reflects the health currently generated from 
the healthcare system (or that could be gained if expenditure were increased) and, therefore, 
reflects the “supply side” of the system. The second is an issue of ‘value’ and depends upon how 
individuals and society value health as compared to other forms of consumption or non-health 
publicly funded goods. This indicates what individuals and society want from the healthcare 
system; or the “demand side”.  
For economic evaluation it is important to consider what type of opportunity costs would result 
from investment in new activities.  If opportunity costs result in the form of health forgone (e.g. 
through displacement of other health generating interventions), then the CET should reflect this 
– let’s denote this ‘k’ (the amount of money that would displace one QALY’s worth of healthcare 
investment).  If opportunity costs are in terms of other forms of consumption, the CET should 
reflect the consumption value of health - let’s denote this ‘v’.  
If we observe that the consumption value of health is higher than the amount of healthcare 
resource required to improve health (v > k) then this suggests that the healthcare system is not 
meeting individual preferences. Individuals would be willing to give up more of the resources 
available to them to improve their own health than the healthcare system would require. There 
are a number of reasons why this may be the case, not least the welfare losses associated with 
socially acceptable ways to finance healthcare systems and the fact that individuals may be willing 
to expend more resources improving their own health than improving the health of others via a 
collectively funded system.  
For incremental CEA to inform the allocation of healthcare expenditures, for which the primarily 
purpose is generally regarded as being the generation of health from limited collective healthcare 
resources, CETs reflecting the opportunity costs of healthcare spending (k) will always be 
required if there are any restrictions on the growth in healthcare expenditure (see Drummond et 
al (2015) chapter 4, section 4.3.4).[1]   
Estimating cost-effectiveness thresholds 
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CETs have not generally been set to reflect k. For instance, values of GB£20-30,000 
andUS$50,000 have commonly been applied in the United Kingdom and United States, 
respectively.[5, 6]  Similarly, for low and middle income countries, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has recommended thresholds of 1 to 3 times gross domestic product per 
capita (GDP pc).[7] These values are not based upon assessment of health opportunity costs 
resulting from resource constraints. The basis for these thresholds is unclear; however, they 
appear to have been conceptually and to some degree empirically informed by the consumption 
value of health (or more accurately estimates of individuals willingness to pay (WTP) to improve 
their own health) – for instance, the WHO threshold is described as being based on estimates 
reported in the “Commission on Macroeconomics and Health” report from 2001.[8] These 
estimates were intended to inform decisions regarding overall investments in healthcare spending 
and used estimates of the WTP for mortality risk reductions. Indeed, similar approaches continue 
to be used to advocate for increased healthcare spending.[9] However, the use of these 
thresholds when assessing the value of individual interventions in the context of existing 
spending limits is not consistent with population health improvement, as they do not reflect the 
opportunity costs that are imposed on healthcare systems. Although demand side thresholds 
might inform social choices about the magnitude of financial resources committed to healthcare, 
they are inappropriate measures of health opportunity cost and so risk reducing, rather than 
increasing, population health when used in the context of CEA.   
Alternatively, the relationship between changes in healthcare expenditure and health outcomes - 
the marginal productivity of the healthcare system in generating health - can be estimated. This 
provides a direct measure of the health consequence of changes in available resources, e.g., when 
a cost-escalating intervention is adopted or what could be gained if additional resources are made 
available in general to fund healthcare. Using such estimates of k to inform CETs provides a 
basis for informing resource allocation decisions with a view to increasing population health.  
However, there is a paucity of estimates of CETs using these approaches. One notable exception 
is Claxton et al.[4] who used local level programme expenditure data, in a range of disease areas, 
to estimate the relationship between changes in healthcare expenditure and health outcomes in 
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the English National Health Service (see Drummond et al (2015), chapter 4, for a full description 
of this work).[1]   
By exploiting the variation in expenditure and in mortality outcomes, Claxton et al. estimate the 
relationship between changes in spending and mortality in those clinical  programme areas in 
which a mortality effect could be identified, while accounting for endogeneity.  With additional 
information about age and gender of the patient population, these mortality effects were 
expressed as a cost per life year threshold (£25,241 per life year).  These life year effects were 
adjusted for quality of life using additional information about quality of life norms by age and 
gender, as well as the quality of life impacts of different types of disease.  By using the effect of 
expenditure on the mortality and life year burden of disease as a surrogate for the effects on a 
more complete measure of health burden (i.e. that includes quality of life burden) a cost per 
QALY threshold was estimated.  This was subject to parameter and structural uncertainty, but a 
central estimate of UK £12,936 per QALY was reported.[4] 
There is growing recognition of the need for estimates of k that reflect opportunity costs in 
terms of health to inform resource allocation decisions in low, middle and high income 
countries.[10, 11] However, with the exception of the work by Claxton et al., there is a lack of 
empirically based estimates of k. This paper draws out the implications of what the limited 
available evidence suggests about ‘supply side’ CETs (k’s) in a range of jurisdictions. We return to 
the subject of how these estimates might be used to inform resource allocation decisions in the 
Discussion.  
 
Methods 
The Claxton et al. estimate of k is based upon estimates of the marginal productivity of 
healthcare spending in just one jurisdiction.[4]  In principle, a similar approach could be adopted 
to estimate the relationship between healthcare spending and health outcomes internationally, 
using countries as units of analysis, to determine k in a wide range of settings. 
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To date, however, cross-country evidence on the productivity of healthcare spending has focused 
on answering the question “does healthcare spending improve health outcomes?”. Recent 
research adjusting for potential reverse causality in this relationship (e.g. governments may spend 
more when health outcomes are worse) suggests that the answer to this question is yes.[12]  
However, the available literature does not focus on how the effect of healthcare spending on 
health outcomes varies according to the level of healthcare spending or country income.  The 
available analyses do suggest that the marginal productivity of healthcare spending diminishes 
with increasing healthcare spending or country income.[13-15] This indicates that the threshold 
should increase with country income or healthcare spending and reflects our expectation that the 
amount of health displaced by new resource commitments decreases as country income or 
healthcare spending rises. However, there is little information to quantify how the marginal 
productivity of healthcare spending varies with country income.  
However, there is a body of literature that estimates v (the consumption value of health or 
‘demand-side’ threshold) in different countries.  Some of this literature is based upon stated 
preference elicitation of individuals’ WTP for morbidity adjusted life years (e.g. QALYs)[16, 17], 
but a larger body of work estimates the ‘value of a statistical life’ (VSL) by estimating individuals’ 
WTP for mortality reductions (e.g. by estimating wage compensation for on the job risk 
exposure).[18, 19]  Moreover, this literature also examines how the VSL varies across 
jurisdictions as a function of national per capita income (i.e. the elasticity of the VSL with respect 
to income, ε). This potentially provides information about the income elasticity of v if we can 
assume that the income elasticity of the VSL is equal to the income elasticity of the value of a life 
year, and this in turn is equal to the income elasticity of the value of a morbidity adjusted life year 
(e.g. QALY).  For this to be the case across countries, a VSL must convert to the same number 
of QALYs across countries (this assumption is examined in the Discussion). 
Understanding the income elasticity of v across countries raises an interesting prospect.  If a 
similar income elasticity of k exists as for v, income elastisticies of the VSL can be applied to the 
Claxton et al. estimate of k for the English NHS to provide estimates of k in a wide range of 
jurisdictions. For the income elasticity of k to equal that of v requires that the ratio between k 
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and v is constant across countries (this assumption is examined in the Discussion). We follow this 
approach to provide estimates of k for application in different countries based upon: their per 
capita income levels, the cost-effectiveness threshold for the UK NHS, per capita income in the 
UK and the elasticity of VSL with respect to income. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1 and 
requires the following three assumptions: (1) that the relative discrepancy between v and k is 
constant across countries; (2) that the values used for k and ε are appropriate estimates; and (3) 
that the income elasticity of the value of a statistical life (VSL) equals the income elasticity of the 
consumption value of a QALY. 
The potential for these assumptions to be violated is examined in the Discussion. However, we 
note that the broad expectation that both v and k will increase with country income is 
uncontentious. As income increases basic consumption needs are met and individuals become 
more willing to exchange income for health (v) and healthcare spending expands accordingly. As 
income and healthcare expenditure rise, the marginal productivity of healthcare spending 
diminishes (k increases).  
Our model requires that healthcare spending will increase such that the predicted increase in k is 
observed. However, we make no assumptions regarding how the expansion to healthcare is 
funded. It could be funded via an expansion to the tax base, a redistribution of the tax base or a 
combination of the two.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The best available estimate of the UK CET is £12,936 per QALY (US$18,609 purchasing power 
parity (PPP) adjusted [20]). Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita estimates for 2013 were 
obtained from the World Bank dataset. In line with the literature on the value of a statistical life, 
elasticities are applied to countries’ GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity [21] (see 
for example Milligan (2014)).[22] CETs are reported in 2013 PPP adjusted US dollar values. 
Values without PPP adjustment are also provided alongside non-PPP adjusted GDP. [23]  We 
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use data on the ratio of the PPP conversion factor to the market exchange rate to remove the 
PPP adjustment but retain the presentation in dollars.[24] 
 
 Estimates of income elasticity for demand for health 
The relationship between the value of a statistical life (VSL) and per capita income at the level of 
jurisdictions is investigated in a small but emerging literature.[19, 22, 25]  The literature has 
evolved out of a longer standing body of work which has examined the relationship between 
income and health valuation at the level of individuals (i.e. ‘within’ countries).[18, 25] Of central 
interest in both these bodies of work (within-group, at the individual level, and between-group, at 
the level of jurisdictions) is the income elasticity of the value of health..  
Initial empirical research conducted primarily in higher income countries amongst individuals, 
and most often in the United States, suggested elasticities in the range 0.4-0.6.[18, 19]  These 
estimates came mainly from cross-sectional studies looking at wage-risk premiums.  However, 
the estimates have been described as “nonsensical” when extrapolated to lower income countries 
since the corresponding VSL would be beyond the ranges considered plausible.[19]   
The methods to estimate the income elasticities of VSL have, therefore, been more carefully 
scrutinized in more recent years.  In particular, cross sectional (‘within group’) estimates from 
earlier studies have been contrasted with longitudinal or cohort (‘between group’) studies (which 
typically estimate elasticities>1; even within countries) and reasons for inconsistencies 
explored.[19, 25, 26]  For instance, Aldy and Smyth (2014) use a life-cycle model applied to US 
data on the consumption and labour supply choices faced by individuals with uncertain life 
expectancy and wage income to explain this discrepancy.[26]  They argue that cross-sectional 
studies are more likely to capture changes in realised income, whereas longitudinal or across 
cohort studies capture the impact of permanent income (i.e. reflecting lifetime opportunities to 
generate income) which is more informative when translating VSL estimates across countries. 
Estimates of elasticity with respect to realised income are lower as realised income is more 
variable.  
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The recent consensus then is that the income elasticity of VSL to transfer estimates across 
countries should be >1.[19, 22]  A range of elasticities were selected for this analysis (1.0, 1.5 and 
2.0) to reflect uncertainty in the literature.  Based upon Milligan et al (2014), a function is also 
applied of an elasticity of 0.7 for ‘high income’ countries (those with gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita >$10,725, 2005 price year, purchasing power parity), and of 2.5 for countries 
with per capita incomes below this threshold.[22] In line with the recommendations in Milligan et 
al. 2014, the elasticities from this study are applied to 2013 PPP-adjusted GDP, deflated to reflect 
2005 international dollars. The resulting threshold values are then inflated to reflect 2013 
international dollars.  
 
Results 
Predicted CETs across country income levels are shown in Figure 2 for a range of income 
elasticities for the VSL. Higher income elasticities imply lower CETs in countries with lower 
GDP pc compared to the UK, and higher CETs in countries with higher GDP pc compared to 
the UK. The impact of alternative choices of elasticity is larger as the discrepancy between the 
GDP of the country of interest and UK GDP widens. Results for a selection of specific countries 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
US dollar CET values with and without PPP adjustment are provided in the appendix for all 
countries for which data were available from the World Bank database for 2013. Values without 
adjustment for PPP can be converted to local currency using standard exchange rates.  
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As exemplar countries, for Malawi (the lowest per capita income country in the world), 
Cambodia (borderline low and low-middle income), El Salvador (borderline low-middle and 
upper-middle income) and Kazakhstan (borderline high-middle and high income) CETs are 
estimated to be $3-116 (1-51% GDP pc), $44-518 (4-51% GDP pc), $422-1967 (11-51% GDP 
pc) and $4,485-8,018 (33-59% GDP pc); respectively.  For Luxembourg (the highest per capita 
income country in the world), we estimate a CET of $43,092-143,342 (39-129% GDP pc). 
 
Discussion 
Policymakers in all countries, whether classified as high, middle or low income, face difficult 
decisions about how to allocate scarce healthcare resources.  CEA offers a means by which to 
compare the costs and health gains from interventions as a basis to inform investment decisions.  
For the results of CEA to align with population health improvement, health gains from 
recommended interventions must exceed the health foregone when resources are committed to 
those interventions. CETs should therefore reflect our best estimates of the opportunity cost of 
healthcare spending (k) and not the consumption value of health (v).   
In this paper we provide indicative estimates of cost-effectiveness thresholds based on 
opportunity costs (the ‘k’s) in a number of countries that intend to reflect the likely marginal 
productivity of their healthcare systems. Due to the lack of attention paid to estimating k in the 
literature to date, the estimates are based on limited data and strong, uncertain assumptions.  The 
estimated CETs are substantially lower than those currently used by decision-making agencies 
and international organizations.  Compared to a threshold of US$50,000 per QALY that has been 
conventionally applied in the US[5] our approach estimates a CET in the range US$24,283-
US$40,112 per QALY. Even more starkly, the thresholds we estimate are far below those of 1-3 
times GDP pc suggested by the WHO for use in low and middle income countries.[7, 8]  In the 
lowest income country in the world, Malawi, we estimate a CET of $3-116 (1-51% GDP pc); and 
in Kazakhstan, a country on the borderline between being middle and high-income, we estimate a 
CET of $4,485-8,018 (33-59% GDP pc).  This implies that resource allocation decisions based 
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upon WHO thresholds are likely to be recommending interventions which can lead to reductions 
in population health. 
 
A separate question is how the estimates of k should be used by healthcare decision makers. It is 
argued here that understanding the full net health effects of an intervention is essential. Decision 
makers must understand the magnitude of direct health gains from an intervention but also the 
health that is expected to be displaced by the interventions costs. An understanding of what the 
health effects of increasing or reducing health expenditure are likely to be (a supply side 
threshold, k) is therefore necessary if social and political choices regarding resource allocation are 
to be made in an informed and accountable way. It is clear, therefore, that in estimating the full 
net health effects of an intervention only those costs that fall on the healthcare budget should be 
included. This approach should never, however, be considered as a single decision making rule, 
and instead should be an input in to a wider decision which is likely to include a range of 
additional considerations including important social value judgements and appropriate 
consideration of the effects decisions are likely to have outside of health (e.g. impact on financial 
protection). However, understanding the opportunity cost on health of using these additional 
considerations is important to guide decisions.  Indeed, in the context of a financially constrained 
healthcare system, any widening of the measure of benefit that informs decisions should also be 
reflected in terms of opportunity costs (e.g. to what extent will the financial protection benefits 
of alternative interventions be foregone).  
Estimates of the consumption value of health (v) have no role in decisions regarding the 
allocation of the scarce available resources for delivering healthcare.[1]  Estimates of the 
consumption value of health may have a role in informing the social choice of what level of 
resources should be devoted to healthcare. However, estimates of individuals’ willingness to trade 
off personal consumption for the collective health gains of increased healthcare spending might 
be more useful for this.  It is not clear that any study to date has estimated this quantity.   
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The results presented rely upon some core assumptions if they are to provide reasonable 
estimates of the marginal productivity of other (non-UK) healthcare systems. The plausibility of 
each assumption is considered in turn.  
(1) that the discrepancy between the consumption value of health (v) and cost-effectiveness 
threshold for health (k) is constant in relative terms across countries  
It is assumed that the proportionate ‘underfunding’ of healthcare, through collectively pooled 
resources relative to individual preferences over consumption and health, is constant across 
countries.  
The ratio between k and v is in fact likely to differ across country income levels. The most 
obvious reason for this is that healthcare budgets may differ across countries for reasons other 
than differences in valuations of health. In lower income countries the size of the healthcare 
budget is likely to be constrained by the ability of countries to raise tax revenues. The difficulties 
faced by low income countries in raising tax are well documented and include the presence of a 
large informal sector, the impact of aid on the size of the state, poor checks and balances that 
reduce the likelihood of common-interest spending, interest groups reducing the propensity to 
tax, low support for higher taxation due to perceptions of corruption and the availability of 
institutions to facilitate tax collection.[27] This is likely to create a downward pressure on the 
healthcare budget (not reflected in our analysis) that will cause k to be lower than we predict. As 
well as having implications for k the reduced size of the healthcare system may result in a greater 
demand for private healthcare spending. There may also be constraints on the ability of countries 
to allocate the available tax base to health as oppose to other state-funded programmes. 
In lower income countries, and particularly for the poorest countries, donor funding may 
represent a significant component of healthcare spending. The available evidence supports some 
substitution of donor funding for government health spending, although the substitution is 
partial.[28] The net effect of donor funding is, therefore, expected to increase public healthcare 
spending and therefore raise k.  
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Depending on whether the restrictions on healthcare expenditure and the influx of donor 
funding increase or decrease the budget beyond what it would otherwise be, k may be smaller or 
larger than predicted by this analysis.  
(2) that the UK estimate of k is correct and that the range of income elasticities (1-2) 
explored includes the correct value  
A recent systematic review[29] identified additional studies estimating the impact of health 
expenditure on health outcomes. Two of these studies were by Martin et al and were precursors 
to the Claxton et al work.[30, 31] Lichtenberg [32] develops a production function for mortality 
reductions using US data. In this model health is generated by previous years of healthcare 
expenditures and the stock of medical innovations.  However, the methods used do not allow us 
to disentangle the impact of time trends in expenditure from other temporal influences on health 
and, therefore, are unlikely to provide a robust estimate of k.   
The UK estimate of k is firmly founded on empirical estimation of the effect of changes in 
expenditure on mortality outcomes while accounting for endogeneity.  The assumptions and 
judgement required are summarised in Table 32 of Claxton et al 2015[33], which also provides 
links to text and footnotes where the qualitative effect of these assumptions are examined in 
greater detail.  The analysis made use of the best available existing evidence and, if anything, is 
more likely to be conservative than optimistic with respect to the health effects of changes in 
NHS expenditure, i.e., is more likely to have over rather than underestimated the UK 
threshold.[34] 
A range of values for the elasticity of the value of a statistical life (ε) was considered, informed by 
the literature; however, it should be noted that there is little robust data on what value ε should 
take. Furthermore, expressions of willingness to pay for individual health gains may differ 
markedly from individuals’ willingness to trade consumption for collective health gains, further 
increasing the uncertainty around the estimates used.  
(3) that the income elasticity of WTP for a QALY can be approximated by ε 
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For the income elasticity of the VSL to equal the income elasticity of WTP for a QALY, a 
statistical life saved should provide the same units of morbidity-adjusted health (e.g. QALYs) 
across countries.  This could be questioned if lives-saved were expected to generate very different 
remaining morbidity-adjusted life expectancies. Although life expectancy at birth varies 
considerably across countries, remaining life expectancy differs much less due to differences in 
age demographics.  For example, Hammitt and Robinson, 2011, find remaining life expectancies 
of between 34 and 45 years in countries with widely varying per capita incomes.[19]  This is a 
result of much older populations in countries with higher life expectancies at birth. Although 
quality of life is likely to increase with income, older populations would also be expected to have 
higher levels of morbidity, so differences in QALYs gained may also be small.  
Therefore, although our results are embedded with many assumptions, it is not immediately clear 
whether these are likely to lead to our estimates of k being positively or negatively biased.   
 
These results should, however, only be regarded as a first attempt to inform this area of crucial 
policy importance. Further empirical evidence is required to inform decision makers’ 
understanding of k.  
Although correlations between healthcare expenditure and health are well established estimates 
of the causal effect of expenditure on health are few. Analysis of cross-country data could be used 
to inform international estimates of the marginal productivity of healthcare spending, and to 
estimate the income elasticity of k and estimate k for different countries reflecting their 
demographics, epidemiology, health expenditure, income and other covariates.[35]  
Within-country research could take a number of forms. Where data are available, the analysis of 
Claxton et al. could be repeated. Econometric analyses of policy reforms and other natural 
experiments could also inform estimates of the marginal productivity of health spending.  
Another approach could be to explore the cost-effectiveness of interventions currently provided 
within a country and those falling outside of the budget envelope.  In this way, policymakers can 
undergo a process of “threshold seeking”[36] and become more informed about k as the number 
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of CEAs in their jurisdiction increases.  One example of a study using an approach similar to this 
is from Malawi and suggests a threshold of no more (and perhaps less) than US$150 in that 
country,[37]  which is slightly above the range (US$3-US$116) estimated here.  Countries could 
also examine specific disinvestment opportunities in order to understand the health likely to be 
displaced by new investments. Similarly, where spending is made up of a relatively small number 
of interventions, a mathematical programming approach may be feasible[38, 39] This approach 
identifies the optimal set of interventions to adopt from a given budget. The ICER of the least 
cost-effective funded intervention provides an estimate of the CET.  
Most importantly, any research intended to inform CETs should focus on estimating the 
opportunity cost of healthcare spending i.e. should focus on k not v. As more empirical evidence 
emerges for specific countries there may also be value in synthesising this information to provide 
better informed extrapolations across countries.  
 
 
Conclusion 
To date there have been no estimates of opportunity cost-based CETs (k’s) for low or middle-
income countries. This paper draws out the implications of the limited available evidence to 
estimate opportunity-cost based CETs for a range of countries. The overall conclusion is that the 
balance of evidence suggests that CETs used to date – such as the WHO estimates – are too high 
and should not be used to inform resource allocation decisions. Further research is needed to 
inform this key but neglected question. In the meantime, decision makers may want to use 
estimates generated here alongside country-specific information on the opportunity cost of 
healthcare funds to inform their resource allocation decisions. 
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Figure 1: Method for inferring country-specific cost-effectiveness thresholds from UK 
threshold 
 
Figure 2: Predicted cost-effectiveness threshold (k) values by country income  
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Table 1: Example results for a range of countries and the World Bank income 
classification cut-offs (2013 GDP per capita) 
  PPP-adjusted (2013 USD) Actual values (2013 USD) Threshold 
as % GDP 
p.c. Country/classification GDP p.c. Threshold range+ GDP p.c. Threshold range+ 
Malawi 
                       
780  9 - 401 
                       
226  3 - 116 1% - 51% 
Indonesia 
                     
9,559  1,298 - 4,914 
                     
3,475  472 - 1,786 14% - 51% 
Chile 
                   
21,911  6,819 - 13,141 
                   
15,732  4,896 - 9,436 31% - 60% 
Kazakhstan 
                   
23,206  7,648 - 13,675 
                   
13,610  4,485 - 8,018 33% - 59% 
United kingdom 
                   
36,197  18,609 - 18,609 
                   
41,787  20,223 - 20,223 48% - 48%# 
Canada 
                   
43,247  21,051 - 26,564 
                   
51,958  25,292 - 31,915 49% - 61% 
United states 
                   
53,143  24,283 - 40,112 
                   
53,042  24,283 - 40,112 46% - 75% 
Norway 
                   
65,461  28,057 - 60,862 
                 
100,819  43,211 - 93,736 43% - 93% 
Low/middle income* 
                     
1,045  16 - 537 
 
 
Not available 
 
1% - 51% 
Middle/high income* 12,746 2,307 - 9,028 18% - 71% 
* We have assumed Gross National Income per capita to be the same as PPP adjusted GDP. 
These values relate to the income cut-offs for low to middle income and middle to high income 
countries as defined by the World Bank.  
+ Reflects range of values obtained when using elasticity estimates of 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 for 
GDP less than $10,725 (2005 PPP USD) and 0.7 for GDP greater than $10,725 (2005 PPP 
USD).  
# For the UK, the World Bank ratio of PPP conversion factor to market exchange rate did not 
correspond to the ratio of reported actual GDP to reported PPP-adjusted GDP. The threshold 
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as a % GDP value for the UK, therefore, depends on whether PPP-adjusted or actual data are 
used (51% and 48% respectively). 
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Appendix: All country values 
The table below presents the PPP-adjusted and non-adjusted range of threshold values for each 
country for which PPP-adjusted GDP was reported in the World Bank database. In some cases 
data was not available to remove the PPP-adjustment and only PPP-adjusted threshold values are 
reported.  
Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Afghanistan 56 - 1,023 19 - 349 
Albania 1,563 - 5,816 702 - 2,612 
Algeria 2,514 - 9,300 1,012 - 3,743 
Angola 807 - 3,875 603 - 2,897 
Antigua and Barbuda 6,250 - 12,750 3,965 - 8,090 
Armenia 858 - 3,997 387 - 1,801 
Australia 21,153 - 26,938 32,771 - 41,732 
Austria 21,355 - 27,684 23,727 - 30,759 
Azerbaijan 4,172 - 11,085 1,901 - 5,051 
Bahrain 21,245 - 27,277 11,962 - 15,358 
Bangladesh 93 - 1,315 30 - 427 
Belarus 4,407 - 11,297 1,895 - 4,857 
Belgium 20,060 - 23,111 22,570 - 26,003 
Belize 1,012 - 4,340 584 - 2,503 
Benin 46 - 921 20 - 414 
Bhutan 835 - 3,943 267 - 1,258 
Bolivia 534 - 3,151 250 - 1,474 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,318 - 4,952 644 - 2,421 
Botswana 3,490 - 10,419 1,621 - 4,839 
Brazil 3,210 - 10,122 2,393 - 7,544 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Brunei Darussalam 29,901 - 73,137 16,065 - 39,294 
Bulgaria 3,609 - 10,541 1,720 - 5,025 
Burkina Faso 38 - 840 17 - 379 
Burundi 8 - 396 3 - 137 
Cabo Verde 584 - 3,297 343 - 1,935 
Cambodia 131 - 1,564 44 - 518 
Cameroon 104 - 1,394 49 - 654 
Canada 21,051 - 26,564 25,292 - 31,915 
Central African Republic 5 - 310 3 - 171 
Chad 61 - 1,070 31 - 540 
Chile 6,819 - 13,141 4,896 - 9,436 
China 2,013 - 7,957 1,151 - 4,550 
Colombia 2,174 - 8,754 1,370 - 5,518 
Comoros 35 - 801 19 - 452 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 - 384 5 - 230 
Congo, Rep. 489 - 3,016 264 - 1,628 
Costa Rica 2,733 - 9,574 2,006 - 7,027 
Cote d'Ivoire 129 - 1,548 61 - 737 
Croatia 6,206 - 12,720 3,953 - 8,101 
Cyprus 12,318 - 16,130 11,020 - 14,430 
Czech Republic 10,620 - 15,322 7,325 - 10,569 
Denmark 20,888 - 25,974 28,767 - 35,771 
Djibouti 128 - 1,541 71 - 857 
Dominica 1,429 - 5,205 991 - 3,611 
Dominican Republic 1,943 - 7,618 937 - 3,675 
Ecuador 1,557 - 5,788 858 - 3,191 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,745 - 6,669 522 - 1,993 
El Salvador 856 - 3,991 422 - 1,967 
Equatorial Guinea 16,150 - 17,717 9,843 - 10,798 
Eritrea 20 - 615 9 - 280 
Estonia 8,912 - 14,418 6,574 - 10,636 
Ethiopia 26 - 696 10 - 255 
Fiji 897 - 4,086 507 - 2,307 
Finland 19,334 - 20,781 23,867 - 25,653 
France 18,861 - 19,347 21,168 - 21,713 
Gabon 5,268 - 12,018 3,164 - 7,218 
Gambia, The 39 - 857 12 - 252 
Georgia 729 - 3,683 366 - 1,850 
Germany 21,080 - 26,668 21,933 - 27,747 
Ghana 224 - 2,043 104 - 951 
Greece 9,345 - 14,658 7,982 - 12,520 
Grenada 1,878 - 7,302 1,272 - 4,948 
Guatemala 756 - 3,750 360 - 1,788 
Guinea 22 - 645 9 - 269 
Guinea-Bissau 22 - 639 9 - 256 
Guyana 610 - 3,368 348 - 1,924 
Haiti 41 - 875 20 - 421 
Honduras 299 - 2,360 149 - 1,177 
Hong Kong SAR, China 24,302 - 40,202 17,409 - 28,801 
Hungary 7,434 - 13,540 4,268 - 7,773 
Iceland 19,942 - 22,720 22,567 - 25,712 
India 416 - 2,781 115 - 770 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Indonesia 1,298 - 4,914 472 - 1,786 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3,450 - 10,378 1,054 - 3,171 
Iraq 3,276 - 10,194 1,504 - 4,679 
Ireland 21,071 - 26,634 23,063 - 29,153 
Israel 15,243 - 17,366 16,821 - 19,163 
Italy 16,712 - 17,928 16,867 - 18,094 
Jamaica 1,122 - 4,570 668 - 2,719 
Japan 18,651 - 18,731 19,769 - 19,854 
Jordan 1,971 - 7,757 872 - 3,432 
Kazakhstan 7,648 - 13,675 4,485 - 8,018 
Kenya 73 - 1,164 32 - 519 
Kiribati 49 - 954 43 - 848 
Korea, Rep. 15,598 - 17,505 12,227 - 13,722 
Kosovo 1,085 - 4,493 473 - 1,961 
Kyrgyz Republic 147 - 1,651 58 - 649 
Lao PDR 329 - 2,474 113 - 852 
Latvia 7,532 - 13,602 5,133 - 9,270 
Lebanon 4,187 - 11,098 2,420 - 6,416 
Lesotho 95 - 1,329 41 - 581 
Liberia 11 - 451 6 - 234 
Libya 6,503 - 12,927 3,697 - 7,349 
Lithuania 9,175 - 14,565 5,598 - 8,886 
Luxembourg 35,195 - 117,072 43,092 - 143,342 
Macao SAR, China 48,116 - 288,671 30,832 - 184,977 
Macedonia, FYR 1,978 - 7,791 824 - 3,246 
Madagascar 28 - 717 9 - 235 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Malawi 9 - 401 3 - 116 
Malaysia 7,709 - 13,712 3,481 - 6,192 
Maldives 1,929 - 7,550 1,103 - 4,318 
Mali 38 - 844 17 - 368 
Malta 12,965 - 16,419 10,138 - 12,838 
Marshall Islands 196 - 1,908 182 - 1,774 
Mauritania 131 - 1,564 46 - 550 
Mauritius 4,202 - 11,112 2,248 - 5,945 
Mexico 3,850 - 10,780 2,410 - 6,749 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 180 - 1,829 162 - 1,646 
Moldova 310 - 2,400 148 - 1,151 
Mongolia 1,264 - 4,849 543 - 2,085 
Montenegro 2,912 - 9,786 1,464 - 4,921 
Morocco 736 - 3,702 316 - 1,590 
Mozambique 16 - 537 8 - 294 
Namibia 1,332 - 4,979 791 - 2,958 
Nepal 72 - 1,154 22 - 357 
Netherlands 21,104 - 26,757 23,153 - 29,354 
New Zealand 17,226 - 18,117 20,555 - 21,619 
Nicaragua 297 - 2,350 118 - 937 
Niger 12 - 469 5 - 213 
Nigeria 446 - 2,880 239 - 1,545 
Norway 28,057 - 60,862 43,211 - 93,736 
Oman 21,322 - 27,562 
 Pakistan 314 - 2,416 87 - 669 
Palau 3,235 - 10,149 2,531 - 7,940 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Panama 5,352 - 12,083 3,042 - 6,869 
Papua New Guinea 92 - 1,305 75 - 1,073 
Paraguay 919 - 4,135 484 - 2,179 
Peru 1,969 - 7,747 1,114 - 4,383 
Philippines 606 - 3,358 256 - 1,421 
Poland 7,694 - 13,703 4,440 - 7,908 
Portugal 9,527 - 14,756 7,738 - 11,985 
Puerto Rico 17,145 - 18,088 14,075 - 14,849 
Qatar 45,558 - 246,565 31,105 - 168,345 
Romania 4,932 - 11,746 2,467 - 5,875 
Russian Federation 8,263 - 14,046 5,007 - 8,511 
Rwanda 30 - 746 13 - 323 
Samoa 363 - 2,598 265 - 1,897 
Sao Tome and Principe 125 - 1,527 68 - 827 
Saudi Arabia 24,484 - 41,080 11,799 - 19,797 
Senegal 73 - 1,166 34 - 544 
Serbia 2,175 - 8,760 1,061 - 4,275 
Seychelles 8,310 - 14,074 5,470 - 9,265 
Sierra Leone 53 - 990 23 - 435 
Singapore 31,889 - 88,068 22,342 - 61,701 
Slovak Republic 9,686 - 14,841 6,561 - 10,053 
Slovenia 11,374 - 15,690 9,135 - 12,603 
Solomon Islands 61 - 1,063 57 - 1,004 
South Africa 2,221 - 8,909 1,175 - 4,714 
South Sudan 77 - 1,198 40 - 617 
Spain 14,638 - 17,124 13,277 - 15,531 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Sri Lanka 1,346 - 5,005 453 - 1,686 
St. Kitts and Nevis 6,222 - 12,731 4,110 - 8,409 
St. Lucia 1,584 - 5,914 1,107 - 4,133 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1,615 - 6,058 998 - 3,746 
Sudan 162 - 1,734 84 - 901 
Suriname 3,740 - 10,672 2,286 - 6,525 
Swaziland 634 - 3,436 288 - 1,559 
Sweden 21,148 - 26,917 28,306 - 36,028 
Switzerland 24,450 - 40,914 36,661 - 61,348 
Tajikistan 90 - 1,291 37 - 533 
Tanzania 45 - 912 18 - 357 
Thailand 2,941 - 9,820 1,181 - 3,943 
Timor-Leste 71 - 1,153 
 Togo 27 - 715 13 - 327 
Tonga 399 - 2,726 333 - 2,275 
Trinidad and Tobago 13,159 - 16,503 7,941 - 9,959 
Tunisia 1,747 - 6,680 678 - 2,592 
Turkey 5,114 - 11,895 2,950 - 6,861 
Turkmenistan 2,784 - 9,635 1,588 - 5,495 
Tuvalu 188 - 1,870 200 - 1,991 
Uganda 28 - 725 11 - 293 
Ukraine 1,097 - 4,518 487 - 2,005 
United Kingdom 18,609 - 18,609 20,223 - 20,223 
United States 24,283 - 40,112 24,283 - 40,112 
Uruguay 5,450 - 12,160 4,548 - 10,147 
Uzbekistan 379 - 2,656 138 - 965 
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Country 
Cost-effectiveness threshold range  
 (USD, PPP adjusted)  (actual USD) 
Vanuatu 127 - 1,538 139 - 1,685 
Venezuela, RB 4,701 - 11,553 3,724 - 9,151 
Vietnam 398 - 2,721 144 - 982 
Yemen, Rep. 223 - 2,035 83 - 757 
Zambia 144 - 1,635 68 - 768 
Zimbabwe 41 - 874 21 - 455 
 
 
 
 
 
 
